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Abstract: This paper explores the ways that critics writing in the early nineteenth century 
developed arguments in favor of what we think of today as the humanities in the face of 
utilitarian pressures that dismissed the arts as self-indulgent pursuits incapable of addressing 
real-world problems. Its focus reflects the extent to which the financial crisis in our own day 
has manifested itself in a jarring shift in research priorities towards applied knowledge: a 
retrenchment which has foregrounded all over again the question of how to make the case for 
the value of the humanities. These problems, however, also constitute an important 
opportunity: a chance to re-imagine our answers to questions about the nature and role of the 
humanities, their potential benefits to contemporary life, and how we might channel these 
benefits back into the larger society. The good news is that in many ways, this self-reflexive 
challenge is precisely what the humanities have always done best: highlight the nature and 
the force of the narratives that have helped to define how we understand our society—its 
various pasts and its possible futures—and to suggest the larger contexts within which these 
issues must ultimately be situated. History repeats itself, but never in quite the same way: 
knowing more about past debates will provide a crucial basis for moving forward as we 
position themselves to respond to new social, economic, technological, and cultural 
challenges during an age of radical change. 
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1. The Present Crisis 
For those of us working in the humanities it is, as Charles Dickens famously said, the best of times 
and the worst of times. The digital revolution has manifested itself in a range of cultural changes that are 
in many ways far more radical than the ones unleashed by the invention of the printing press over five 
hundred years ago, and they have made their presence felt far more swiftly. Where those earlier changes 
took centuries before their impact was fully realized, the digital revolution has redefined our 
communicative world in decades. And whereas the invention of moveable type preserved the basic form 
of the codex, the digital revolution has altered the most fundamental ways that it is possible to think 
about the materiality of writing, and about the relation between books and texts. Its interactive 
possibilities have also forced us to reimagine our ideas about the relationship between authors and 
readers, and between the individual reader and the reading public (or publics) to which he or she may 
feel they belong. Never before has a generation lived through such extraordinary technological and 
cultural changes. 
Nor are these changes limited to those emerging creative and critical forms that have become known 
as digital humanities. The advent of new technologies and the new forms of textual community they 
enable have cast those earlier technologies of writing associated with manuscript and print culture in an 
exciting new light by helping to expose many of the assumptions that had, until the last couple of 
decades, been so thoroughly naturalized that they resisted critical analysis. As critics such as Adrien 
Johns and Andrew Piper have argued, becoming more attuned to the historical arbitrariness of these 
technological achievements (the fact that their history did not unfold in any preordained way) has made 
us newly aware of the kinds of ideological work that were required in order not to think about the many 
forms of mediation (cultural, political, technological, educational, economic) that had naturalized these 
earlier forms of textual production [1,2]. As a result of these changes in our own day, we have very 
rapidly grown used to thinking in far broader terms about the kinds of infrastructure that lurk just 
beneath the surface of the production, circulation, and reception of the books whose material reality 
earlier critics tended to dismiss in order to concentrate on the literary richness of the ideas they 
contained. Predictions of “the death of the book” (a media favorite for the past several years, though it 
seems to have diminished recently) may have been premature, but we can never take the idea of “the 
book” for granted again. 
That is the upside. But if the extraordinarily rapid and wide-ranging changes unleashed by the digital 
revolution have shaken up our most entrenched assumptions about important forms of cultural 
production and reception in critically exciting ways, it is equally true that it is hard to think of a time 
when the humanities were so badly besieged on any number of levels, the most serious of which has 
been a jarring shift in research priorities towards market-driven applied knowledge: a retrenchment that 
has foregrounded all over again the question of how to make the case for the value of the humanities. As 
Martha Nussbaum has recently argued, “we are in the midst of a crisis of massive proportions and grave 
global significance”: not “the global economic crisis that began in 2008” (though that context is 
definitely part of the issue), but the widespread erosion of support for the humanities in terms of both 
pedagogical and research priorities within universities ([3], pp. 1–2). Nussbaum’s book—Not For 
Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities—has become a widely cited element of this debate, but 
the urgency of the topic has generated numerous books and articles, many of them by distinguished 
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scholars in a range of venues, from academic journals to leading magazines and newspapers. As 
Marjorie Perloff put it in an article entitled “Crisis in the Humanities”, “[o]ne of our most common 
genres today is the epitaph for the humanities” [4]. The phrase itself—crisis in the humanities—has 
become so familiar that it has begun to appear in scare quotes, along with warnings that just because 
everyone is saying it, doesn’t mean it isn’t true. “You’ve probably heard several times already that the 
humanities are in ‘crisis’”, Gordon Hunter and Feisal G. Mohammed wrote in a New Republic article 
entitled “The Real Humanities Crisis Is Happening at Public Universities”, but as their title implies, this 
doesn’t mean that we should doubt it. “The crisis is real”, they assure us [5]. Few would contradict them. 
In a column in the New York Times that was prompted by the threat of SUNY Albany to close their 
French, Italian, Classics, Russian and theater programs, Stanley Fish responded to a letter from one of 
his readers that it “will be a sad, sad day if and when we allow the humanities to collapse” by insisting 
“that it had already happened”. Fish’s tone of world-weary resignation struck many people as misguided 
(“I have always had trouble believing in the high-minded case for a core curriculum—that it preserves 
and transmits the best that has been thought and said—but I believe fully in the core curriculum as a 
device of employment for me and my fellow humanists”), but his pessimism is widely shared [6]. Robert 
Weisbuch is on safe ground in his insistence that “today’s consensus about the state of the 
humanities—it’s bad, it’s getting worse, and no one is doing much about it—is supported by dismal 
facts” ([7], p. B4). However illustrious their past, the humanities have no future at all, so these epitaphs 
suggest, and that recognition has put its stamp on our present discussions like few other topics today, the 
digital revolution not excepted. 
The signs of this crisis are everywhere around us. In England, the government’s 2010 decision to 
cancel funding for the teaching of humanities programs has been doubled by the spirit of intellectual 
recoil that characterizes its new Research Excellence Framework, which was recently established as the 
official basis for determining research funding allocations amongst English universities. As Stefan 
Collini has pointed out, part of this formula for funding allocation depends on what the Research 
Excellence Framework calls the “impact” of research, a somewhat nebulous concept which the 
Framework breaks down into thirty-seven categories, each of which is in turn measured by a series of 
“indicators” such as (to quote the Framework) “creating new businesses”, “commercializing new 
products or processes”, and “attracting R & D investment from global business” (quoted in [8], p. 18). 
As Collini points out, the final category, the only one where the work of most humanities scholars might 
easily be slotted, which is headed “other quality of life benefits”, is unique amongst the thirty-seven in 
having no examples provided. In place of the sorts of concrete indicators suggested in the other thirty-six 
examples of research impact, this final one contains a one-line note that merely says: “please suggest 
what might also be included in this list” (quoted in [8], p. 18). Admittedly, the “impact” score accounts 
for only 20% of the overall assessment (likely to rise to 25% in the next REF cycle); publications in 
scholarly journals of “high quality” still weigh far more heavily. But this inability to imagine the 
“impact” or usefulness of the humanities is a chilling index of a broader failure of the same kind. These 
institutional pressures are also taking more insidious forms, such as the current shift within the U.K. to 
an emphasis on “open access” publishing. Few would disagree with the intrinsic worth of this idea in the 
abstract, but the fact that publishing costs will be downloaded to researchers has opened the door to 
further problems by enabling universities to target which areas of research will receive support to offset 
these costs. 
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Evidence of these problems is just as hard to miss in Canada, where I live and work, from the federal 
government’s $7 million cut to SSHRC 1 funding in 2012 (all of which was replaced by targeted funding 
emphasizing collaboration with industry, or more broadly, non-academic partners); to the cancellation of 
the Ontario Research Fund, including the special round for the Social Sciences, Arts, and Humanities; to 
the growing sway of a narrow cluster of research priorities (health, environment, and digital 
technologies) and a rhetorical emphasis on addressing “real-life problems” within universities’ strategic 
plans. It is borne out, over and over again, in the closure of university departments and programs, the 
budget cuts, and the general climate of suspicion that have become part of our day-to-day experience. In 
2013, the University of Alberta announced that it had suspended admission to twenty humanities 
programs. An editorial entitled “Liberal Arts and Commercial Utility” in the Globe and Mail (Canada’s 
leading national newspaper) epitomized this reactionary climate in its warning that “the liberal arts are 
necessary and good, but not sufficient in the modern age” ([9], p. F8). If, as Percy Shelley once famously 
complained, poets had been challenged “to resign the civic crown to reasoners and mechanists”, this 
same tension has reemerged today in the face of a new utilitarianism ([10], p. 131). 
But as serious as these problems are, it is important to recognize that they are not reducible to a 
growing antagonism to the humanities alone. Scientists within and outside of universities have been 
equally outraged by what they regard as an unprecedented attack on the idea of curiosity-driven abstract 
research: the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself. In December 2012, hundreds of leading scientists 
in lab coats marched in front of Parliament Hill to protest being muzzled by a government that is 
mistrustful of any sort of research that is not in step with their business agenda. Five months later, John 
McDougall, the Calgary businessman who serves as President of Canada’s National Research Council 
(once a highly respected body of scientific researchers) made headlines by insisting that “innovation is 
not valuable unless it has commercial value”. McDougall’s comments were part of an announcement of 
a broader shift in the NRC's focus towards research the government deems “commercially viable” [11]. 
As an editorial about the fate of the NRC in the Toronto Star put it, “once a bastion of pure 
research—exploratory science no business would pay for but which is essential to eventual 
innovation—the agency has been redesigned to respond to industry requests, its $900-million budget 
effectively transformed into a business subsidy” [12]. Within universities, this attack on pure research is 
part of an underlying tendency to thinking about the role of the university in more narrowly vocational 
terms as an institution whose primary role is to ensure that graduates secure well-paying jobs. Months 
after McDougall’s announcement, the ACCUTE 2 president, Stephen Slemon, warned that as sharply as 
the humanities have felt the burden of financial cuts, it is crucial to recognize this wider context: “we are 
all under attack. I don’t know anyone now working in any of the postsecondary human or natural 
sciences who does not feel institutionally threatened” [13]. 
As Slemon suggests, it is important to recognize the extent to which the crisis in the humanities today 
is intensified by this double threat: a shift away from the humanities towards STEM disciplines (Science, 
Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) that is compounded by a broader resistance to curiosity-driven 
research in both the arts and the sciences. Worse, as critics such as Collini and Thomas Docherty have 
                                                          
1  SSHRC, or the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, is the main source of research funding for academics 
working in the humanities and social sciences. 
2  The Association of Canadian College and University Teachers in English is in many ways the Canadian equivalent of  
the MLA. 
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recently argued, this double problem is further intensified by a growing suspicion of universities 
generally [14,15]. “At a moment when the number of students currently enrolled in these institutions 
across the globe is several times larger than was the case only a generation ago, there is unprecedented 
skepticism about the benefits (both intellectual and material) of a university education” ([14], p. 3). 
Based within institutions that are increasingly underfunded, besieged by a growing insistence on the 
exclusive worth of “commercially viable” research, and rooted in the most vulnerable side of the 
disciplinary divide within universities, support for the humanities has been weakened by a growing 
skepticism about any sort of research that cannot be converted into short term market-based applications, 
and any sort of education that is unlikely to lead to good jobs. (It seems to do little good to cite studies 
that indicate that humanities graduates fare equally well in their subsequent careers, even if it the 
transition from university to a good job takes slightly longer.) “The liberal arts are necessary and good”, 
the saying goes, but clearly “not sufficient in the modern age”. The best of times and the worst of times, 
for sure. 
2. Past Debates 
These problems, however, also constitute an important opportunity: a chance to re-imagine our 
answers to questions about the nature and role of the humanities, their potential benefits to contemporary 
life, and how we might channel these benefits back into the larger society. The good news is that in many 
ways, this self-reflexive challenge is precisely what the humanities have always done best: highlight the 
nature and the force of the narratives that have helped to define how we understand our society—its 
various pasts and its possible futures—and to suggest the larger contexts within which these issues must 
ultimately be situated. In his introduction to The Public Value of the Humanities, Jonathan Bate points 
out that: 
one of the values of the humanities is that it teaches us that all controversies have historical 
precedents—the lessons of which we are very good at ignoring. The debate between those 
who look for the ‘economic impact’ of academic research and those who appeal to the 
pursuit of knowledge as a civilizing virtue replicates a dichotomy identified by John Stuart 
Mill in the early Victorian era, in his pair of essays on Jeremy Bentham (written in 1838) and 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1840) ([16], p.10). 
As Bate points out, Mill’s aim in these essays was to emphasize a lesson that was “given to mankind 
by every age, and always disregarded—to show that speculative philosophy, which to the superficial 
appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interests of men, is in reality the thing 
which most influences them, and in the long run overbears every other influence save those which it 
must itself obey” (quoted in [16], p. 10). Gesturing to similar parallels between nineteenth-century 
debates and today’s crisis in confidence about the worth of the humanities, Francis O’Gorman agrees 
that “it is one of the small advantages for literary and cultural historians that they know the place of the 
arts and humanities in national education has been debated before” ([17], p. 272). A sense of crisis can 
encourage a narrowing of focus to present-day difficulties at the expense of a longer historical 
perspective, but as Bate and O’Gorman rightly point out, the question of the role of the humanities has 
been debated in remarkably similar ways before, and in the face of similar pressures. What interests me 
is the long history of this crisis and the insights that this might have to offer about our own predicament 
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today. History repeats itself, but never in quite the same way: knowing more about past debates will 
provide a crucial basis for moving forward as universities, and the humanities in particular, position 
themselves to respond to new social, economic, technological, and cultural challenges during an age of 
radical change. 
The single most important aspect of this history may be the fact that the humanities emerged in their 
modern form during an age not unlike our own, in which leading activists such as Bentham and James 
Mill resisted any vision of reform that was not driven by a central recognition of the importance of 
applied knowledge. For utilitarians such as Thomas Love Peacock (a poet himself in earlier days), the 
poet was “a waster of his own time, and a robber of that of others”, whose cultivation of poetry had been 
“to the neglect of some branch of useful study”, in stark contrast with the tendency of “the thinking and 
studious, and scientific and philosophical part of the community” to draw on “the materials of useful 
knowledge” in order to prepare one’s self for “the real business of life” ([18], pp. 578–79). These sorts of 
views are crucial for two reasons. Utilitarians’ hostility to poetry (and to imaginative expression 
generally) represented a challenge that would help to define the struggle to articulate a role for the 
humanities at the precise historical moment when the idea of culture was crystallizing into its modern 
form. But just as importantly, the utilitarians were themselves reformers eager to effect social change, 
which made the challenge of responding to their hostile ideas about the social worth of poetry especially 
urgent. As with today, it was never a debate between reformers and reactionaries, but about what forms 
of knowledge production mattered amongst those people who shared a commitment to social and 
political improvement. 
The crisis that forces us to make the case for the humanities today in the face of similar pressures to 
focus on “useful knowledge” that is suited to “the real business of life” can best be answered with a 
clearer understanding of the ways that ideas about the humanities were forged in the crucible of this 
spirit of intellectual reaction which defined itself in terms of the unique importance of more “serious” 
forms of knowledge. For early nineteenth-century advocates such as Shelley, William Hazlitt, and Leigh 
Hunt, the arts constituted a central aspect of a larger struggle for social progress, but like today, these 
arguments were themselves sharpened by the need to challenge a utilitarian emphasis on the primacy of 
applied knowledge. These writers anticipated Albert Einstein’s famous comment that “imagination is 
more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while 
imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and understand” ([19], p. 97). 
But they did so in a polemical spirit that was animated by the need to make a case for the importance of 
the humanities in the face of a backlash against the value of imaginative expression. 
Those writers who sought to make a case for the arts responded in a range of ways, from Hazlitt’s and 
Thomas Carlyle’s vehement opposition to utilitarianism’s reductive moral calculus, to Hunt’s and John 
Stuart Mill’s efforts to forge some degree of common ground, to Francis Jeffrey’s struggle to adapt the 
legacy of Scottish Enlightenment accounts of sympathy to the demands of an industrial society. 
Shelley’s response, which was in many ways the most radical and the most theoretically sophisticated of 
his age, and which it has become crucial to make again, if in slightly different terms, was that poetry—or 
today, the humanities—must be understood, not as the opposite but at the limits of applied knowledge: a 
larger perspective that enables us “to imagine that which we know”, in part by highlighting the 
“unapprehended relations” within which particular innovations must be situated ([10], pp. 111, 134). 
Poetry, he argued, offers a potential for insight into the nature and limits of applied knowledge capable 
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of extending the transformative power of reason by setting reason against itself in a self-reflexive turn 
which belongs to the province of the imagination. The implication of Shelley’s argument was that poetry 
was the more important or “useful” form of knowledge, even in Peacock’s rigidly utilitarian terms, but if 
Shelley’s insistence on the importance of fostering larger critical contexts within which to think about 
these issues (“imagin[ing] that which we know”) is just as relevant today as it was two hundred years 
ago, his intervention is equally instructive in another way as well. 
Our sense of crisis has helped to foster an energetic and sophisticated debate about the nature and 
value of the humanities but it is worth emphasizing that a crisis mentality has risks of its own. Besieged 
on all sides, it can be hard to resist a set of sometimes counterproductive consolatory narratives about 
why the humanities matter, many of which either view our neglect as an ironic badge of honor—the fact 
that we remain proudly out of step with the larger vocational and commercial spirit of our age—or which 
simply reverse the kinds of intellectual prejudices that we are protesting against. W. H. Auden’s claim 
that “poetry makes nothing happen: it survives/ In the valley of its making where executives/ Would 
never want to tamper” is understandably tempting, especially given many corporate executives’ evident 
lack of concern for poetry, but this sort of special pleading for some rarified position sheltered from the 
corrupting influence of the world will not ultimately help us to develop an adequate response to the crisis 
in the humanities today [20]. 
Posing the question, “What, then, can be done?” Fish warns “it won’t do to invoke the pieties” that 
have become familiar elements of this debate: “the humanities enhance our culture; the humanities make 
our society better—because those pieties have a 19th century air about them and are not even believed in 
by some who rehearse them” [6]. Alex Usher, the author of a popular on-line column offered by the 
Higher Education Strategy Associates, puts it even more bluntly. Taking issue with the kinds of 
positions espoused by Rosanna Warren in her New Republic article, “The Decline of the 
Humanities—and Civilization”, which imply that the humanities have some sort of monopoly on 
teaching people “what it is to be fully human”, Usher warns against the reaction that this kind of 
self-aggrandizing claim produces: “Honestly, how self-absorbed, smug, self-righteous and arrogant does 
one have to be to believe that one’s own work is solely responsible for the maintenance of all human 
progress since the Renaissance? After reading it, I actively wanted to go around, eliminating random 
humanities departments out of sheer spite” [21]. It is worth adding that Usher has nothing against 
humanities programs, but his response is both understandable and illuminating: arguments which imply 
that the humanities are somehow inherently superior to other intellectual fields, or that those people who 
have not benefited from a humanities education are not “fully human” (even if they mistakenly think 
they are) are inevitably going to rub people the wrong way. 
Which brings us back to Shelley’s Defense of Poetry, a polemic that, read superficially, seems to 
epitomize the self-righteous strain that Usher objects to in Warner’s argument. Stung by Peacock’s 
diatribe against poetry, Shelley fought back by insisting on the paramount importance of those 
committed to the task of “enlarg[ing] our imagination” or, as critics might put it today, helping us “to be 
fully human” ([10], p. 132). Had “reasoners” such as Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire, Rousseau and 
their disciples never struggled on behalf of “oppressed and deluded humanity”, Shelley allowed, “a little 
more nonsense would have been talked for a century or two; and perhaps a few more men, women and 
children, burnt as heretics. We might not at this moment have been congratulating each other on the 
abolition of the Inquisition in Spain” ([10], p. 132). These reforms were all good things, Shelley 
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acknowledged, but in comparison with their limited impact, “it exceeds all imagination to conceive what 
would have been the moral condition of the world if neither Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, 
Shakespeare, Calderon, Lord Bacon, nor Milton, had ever existed; if Raphael and Michael Angelo had 
never been born; if the Hebrew poetry had never been translated; if a revival of the study of  
Greek literature had never taken place; if no monuments of ancient sculpture had been handed down to 
us” ([10], p. 132). 
It sounds awful, of course, a high-water mark in “self-absorbed, smug, self-righteous and arrogant” 
responses to anyone who would dare to criticize the importance of the arts or humanities. Who cares if a 
few more or less “oppressed and deluded” people die cruel and unnecessary deaths compared with the 
horror of living in a world without Shakespeare and Milton. Except that Shelley is a step ahead of us. His 
real point, as he quickly makes clear, is not that the “higher truths” offered by those individuals blessed 
with artistic genius trumps social reform but that this latter group—the “promoters of utility”—are in 
danger of intervening in ways that are ultimately counterproductive because they have been blinded by 
their uncritical faith in the force of reason and the sufficiency of applied knowledge. Having neglected 
the task of “enlarg[ing] their imagination”, they have failed to ask the more serious questions about both 
the unexamined assumptions and unintended consequences of their efforts. Their uncritical commitment 
to an eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century form of technological determinism left them exposed to 
the danger of what Shelley denounced as “the abuse of all invention for abridging and combining labor, 
to the exasperation of the inequality of mankind” ([10], p. 134). His reference, of course, was to the 
disastrous effects of that best and worst innovation of the industrial age known as the assembly line, 
which works precisely through abridging and combining labor. The opening pages of Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations featured a reverential depiction of the almost magical force of a proper division of 
labor in something as “trifling” as a pin factory, in which the work is “divided into about eighteen 
distinct operations” ([22], pp. 14–15). All that was needed was that the workers be “collected”, where 
the scale of the operation allowed, “into the same workhouse” ([22], p. 14), an arrangement that was 
central to what Smith lauded as the task of “reducing every man’s business to some one simple 
operation, and … making this operation the sole employment of his life” ([22], p. 18). Lest we should be 
in danger of missing the fact that this is what he too has in mind, Shelley repeats himself in an almost 
identical description four paragraphs later: 
Whilst the mechanist abridges, and the political economist combines, labor, let them beware 
that their speculations, for want of correspondence with those first principles which belong 
to the imagination, do not tend, as they have in modern England, to exasperate at once the 
extremes of luxury and want ([10], p. 132). 
Shelley’s argument was not ultimately with social activists’ struggle to achieve political reform (his 
polemic, A Philosophical View of Reform, tended to regard them in more generous terms as important 
allies in the struggle for social progress) but with the dangerous lack of perspective that uncritical ideas 
about reason as an engine of progress and technology as an inherently beneficial force implied: the 
unintended “abuse” of new forms of instrumentalist knowledge. 
Shelley’s concern here is about fundamental social realities rather than higher spiritual truths, about 
economics rather than aesthetics: about the sorts of issues which ought to have been more forcefully 
championed by Enlightenment reformers, had they thought imaginatively enough about the impact of 
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their own struggles. The reformist dream of rational progress had collapsed into a utilitarianism which, 
despite its triumphalist rhetoric, only reinforced existing inequalities. Knowledge had fallen prisoner to 
the very historical forces that it had presumed to challenge; history remained the nightmare that 
reformers were struggling to wake up from. Or as Shelley rather unpoetically put it, “the rich have 
become richer, and the poor have become poorer” ([10], p. 132). His point was not that Enlightenment 
reformers’ efforts had not mattered but rather that they had been undermined by the tendency of their 
very success to overshadow the larger sorts of questions that would help to ensure their ongoing social 
good. Poetry (or the arts) offered a radical extension of the critical impulse associated with reason, an 
amplification rather than a negation of its transformative power (or “impact”) which insists on the 
primacy of a much broader sense of the “unapprehended relations” within which particular developments 
must be situated ([10], p. 111). 
Nor, for Shelley, was this merely a historical coincidence. On the contrary, it was precisely the 
breathtaking pace of change that had fostered this faith in technology as an end in itself. People had lost 
perspective, which is the real danger in times of rapid and fundamental change: “We have more moral, 
political and historical wisdom, than we know how to reduce into practice; we have more scientific and 
economical knowledge than can be accommodated to the just distribution of the produce which it 
multiplies. The poetry in these systems of thought, is concealed by the accumulation of facts and 
calculating processes” ([10], p. 134). The problem lay in an imbalance between applied and 
self-reflexive knowledge: “a cultivation of the mechanical arts in a degree disproportioned to the 
presence of the creative faculty... From what other cause has it arisen that these inventions which should 
have lightened, have added a weight to the curse imposed on Adam?” ([10], p. 134). 
Shelley’s critique amounts to an early version of the argument that Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno would offer in Dialectic of Enlightenment, that the progress of enlightened thought tended, by its 
very nature, to undermine itself because its very successes weakened the all-important tension between 
these two very different kinds of knowledge: the technological field of applied expertise and a critical 
self-reflexiveness (Shelley’s “poetic faculty”) that ought to pose questions about the larger context 
within which instrumentalist advances ought to be situated [23]. Horkheimer and Adorno were 
ultimately pessimistic about the possibility of reversing this process, but for Shelley, the poetic 
imagination was also a form of praxis, simultaneously a set of critical insights and a force that would 
generate the impulse to put these into action: “We want the creative faculty to imagine that which we 
know; we want the generous impulse to act that which we imagine” ([10], p. 134). Nor was this task 
altogether difficult, had people the will to do so: “There is no want of knowledge respecting what is 
wisest and best in morals, government, and political economy, or at least, what is wiser and better than 
what men now practice and endure. But we let ‘I dare not wait upon I would, like the poor cat in the 
adage’” ([10], p. 134). 
3. Future Roles 
This emphasis on poetry as a critical perspective from which to reconsider inherited ideas and as a 
spur to act on the conclusions this reconsideration suggested may ultimately have been a bit romantic. 
Poetry may never have possessed the revolutionary power that Shelley suggests. But having said so, it is 
worth emphasizing the timeliness of Shelley’s argument about the dangers of the scramble to embrace 
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applied knowledge at the expense of any adequate recognition of larger social and political contexts: the 
“unapprehended relations” within which these solutions to so-called real-world problems must be 
situated. And this is where he might well have found an ally in critics such as Usher. Having been 
challenged by his readers to answer the question of what sort of arguments we might want to make, in 
place of the self-serving claims for the unique power of the humanities that he had denounced, Usher 
cites Paul Wells’ argument in his 2010 article, “In Praise of the Squishy Subjects”, that “societal 
problems are incredibly complex and can’t be explained by simple cause-and-effect, what the 
humanities do is get people used to the idea of complexity” [24,25]. Especially, one might add, in times 
when rapid change heightens both the appeal and the dangers of an unexamined faith in innovation. As 
Stanley Fish rightly warns us, making our case by appealing to values that sound like they belong to 
another era won’t be much help in our efforts to persuade the broader public of our worth, but ironically, 
knowing more about the long history of the struggle to make this case may itself be instructive in forging 
the kinds of arguments that will help as we try to position ourselves in a rapidly changing present. 
All of this highlights both the urgency and the complexity of what seem to me to be the most 
important points that have emerged out of the debates that this crisis in support for the humanities  
has triggered: 
The first and most important is the question of how we make the case for the humanities to people 
outside of our own academic community. How do we avoid the trap of simply preaching to the 
converted? We are bedevilled by the paradox that the positions that will likely be the most popular 
amongst us, even when we get these arguments right, may be hardest to convey to the broader public in 
any really convincing way. Wells is absolutely right that what may seem like the most necessary 
strategy—clambering onto the rhetorical bandwagons of the day—won’t get us very far. Citing 
arguments made by Noreen Golfman (then president of the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and 
Social Science) “about the contribution of social sciences and humanities research to innovation, and to 
our nation’s ability to compete globally and be an effective partner in the international community”, in 
part “by stimulating the need for economic recovery in the short term and by shaping the broader 
prospects for Canada’s future”, Wells rightly dismisses these arguments as unconvincing gestures to 
short-term thinking (quoted in [25]). They sound both opportunistic and, what may be worse, tedious. 
But they do clarify the importance of forging arguments that we can believe in in ways that will resonate 
with people outside of our own academic community. A bit of history, which is one of the things that we 
can bring to the discussion, can help a lot. The other side of this question is the issue of how far can we 
push the argument that the self-reflexive space of critical thinking fostered by the humanities offers a 
more useful form of knowledge than other “commercially viable” forms without surrendering to the 
utilitarian or vocational logic that this argument is intended to resist. But do we have a choice? 
My other points emerge from this initial one. The first is that we need to be wary of the intellectual 
cost of the arguments that we have been forced into making, over and over and over again, in favour of 
the humanities. It’s not that these arguments aren’t legitimate (I think they are). And it is definitely not 
the case that we don’t have to make them. But in being forced to make them so repeatedly and so 
defensively, we can travel down an intellectual dead-end that does as much harm as it does good. Here’s 
a simple if anecdotal way of explaining what I mean: I became Chair of an English department a little 
over six years ago in a Faculty that includes both the arts and social sciences. At the time, the mood was 
expansive and intellectually generous: the real emphasis was on the common ground between those two 
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groups. That never really changed, but by the time I stepped down as Chair this past year, our talk had 
been hijacked by an embattled sense of how to make the case for the humanities in the face of a climate, 
both within and outside of the university, that does not seem to place much value in what we do. It’s not 
that we fell out with our colleagues on the social sciences side of the fence—the opposite was true, much 
to their credit—but in defending the humanities, we had been forced into focusing on a set of far less 
interesting conversations. 
The trickiest question may lie in the unexamined tension between the humanities as a field of critical 
analysis and humanism as an inherited set of cultural values. How we can make a case for the humanities 
in ways that do not depend on what many of us now regard as the outmoded assumptions that were 
central to traditional models of humanism? This is the most fundamental question that confronts us: do 
we know what we mean by “the humanities” in an age when most of us who work in the area no longer 
align ourselves with the humanist ideals that provided our disciplines’ rationale as they emerged in their 
modern form in the nineteenth century. It is not simply that, as Fish points out, these “pieties”—“the 
humanities enhance our culture; the humanities make our society better”—no longer strike us 
convincing; they seem to be bound up with a highly conservative deference to authority and resistance to 
activist intervention that has the potential to be deeply reactionary [6]. We avoid them, not because 
we’re embarrassed by their dated feel, but because we’re suspicious of their political implications. We 
may no longer need to explain the problems that an Arnoldian humanist rhetoric about the disinterested 
contemplation of universal truths entailed, but our rejection of it does raise the thorny question of what 
we actually mean by the humanities today, in an age that is increasingly uncomfortable with inherited 
definitions of the term “humanism”. It raises the question of how we can make that case to the broader 
public, if not to our senior administrators, without appearing to be either self-contradictory or just 
intellectually dishonest. To put this more constructively, how might we begin to theorize a new “new 
humanism”—not the highly conservative school of thought which became known as the new humanism in 
the first half of the twentieth century, but one that takes an honest engagement with these tensions as its 
starting point without abandoning the political impulse that helped to fuel critiques of humanism in the name 
of a historically grounded politics of difference in recent decades? 
Rather than confronting this dilemma as a problem, it may be more accurate and more productive to 
recognize it as a valuable starting-point as we position ourselves to answer the question of the future role 
of the humanities. If we rid ourselves of the baggage of the sorts of outmoded “pieties” that Fish cautions 
us against, which include the idea that the humanities have a singular ability to make us “fully human”, 
we can concentrate on Paul Wells’ point, which Usher rightly endorses and which has become a central 
aspect of the many discussions that this crisis has prompted, that the humanities train us to be more fully 
engaged with the issues of our day. This emphasis on fostering engaged forms of citizenship, which 
epitomizes what has become known as the ethical turn in the work of theorists such as Jacques Derrida 
and Emmanuel Levinas, has been especially true of recent debates about globalization, which have 
highlighted the ways that the relentless traffic of ideas and bodies, goods and wealth, pipelines and 
pollutants, across borders and oceans has produced both new cultural formations and reinvigorated 
hegemonic orders. An insistence on the importance of recognizing the simultaneity of both of these 
aspects of our modernity—the growing possibilities of collaboration on the one hand and the persistent 
forms of economic exploitation and the cultural dissonance between incommensurable traditions and 
value systems on the other—has been a hallmark of these debates. But this emphasis on encouraging a 
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comfort with complexity as a basis of new forms of engagement has been equally central to a range of 
other questions, from the efforts of posthumanist critics such as Cary Wolfe to complicate debates about 
animal rights, to the ways that the concept of “geological agency” proposed by Dipesh Chakrabarty have 
enabled us to reframe environmental issues, to Marxist critiques of neoliberalism. Running through all 
of these has been an emphasis on the importance of embracing those forms of complexity that flourish in 
times of fundamental change when it is no longer possible to deal with emerging problems using 
inherited methodologies. 3 
Offering “a reminder that you can never know what you’ll need to know”, and that it can therefore 
never be enough to work hard to “figure out the answers to important questions” without adequately 
considering if they are the right questions, or if they have been formulated in the most helpful ways, 
Wells points out that what really matters is the challenge of fostering a climate where irreducible 
complexity is welcome: 
Very few of the problems our society faces admit to narrow technical solutions. There is no 
genome for crime or poverty or the listless emptiness that comes from punching a time clock. 
There is no subatomic particle which, once discovered and mapped, will coax a song into 
giving up its secrets or make the subjunctive verb tense easier to conjugate. These things are 
mysteries and they will remain mysteries right to the heart of them. It is helpful, then, to have 
people around who are used to mystery [25]. 
For Wells (and Usher) this is where the humanities have an important role to play: 
If you spend a few years wrestling with the idea of society as propounded by Hobbes, Locke, 
Mill, Rousseau and Marx, you come away with a better understanding of all the alternative 
ways our own society might choose to configure itself, with their attendant risks. If you 
study the fur trade in British North America, you learn something lasting about the 
contribution of aboriginal Canadians to our politics and economics, and you begin to 
understand the behaviour of today’s Canadian businesses a little better. Read Goethe or 
Cervantes in the original and you understand things about Germany and Spain today that 
Goethe and Cervantes cannot have imagined [25]. 
It may not even be the case that a humanities education will be useful because it offers a kind of soft 
version of applied knowledge: a training in all of those things that you didn’t know would help you to 
address particular problems but did—a history of the fur trade as an illuminating perspective on 
Canadian business, or of political theory on questions about public policy. It can do that, for sure. Even 
more fundamentally, and maybe more importantly, by teaching us to be comfortable with complexity, 
and by encouraging us to realize that complexity is a central characteristic of our world rather than 
something that needs to be reduced out of existence, it can train us to be more genuinely engaged citizens 
in a world that is going through extraordinary changes. In doing so, the humanities will indeed play a 
                                                          
3  For arguments about globalization, see for instance, Timothy Brennan, At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism  
Now [26], Bruce Robbins, Perpetual War: Cosmopolitanism From The Viewpoint Of Violence [27], and Robbins and 
Pheng Cheah, Cosmopolitics: Thinking And Feeling Beyond The Nation [28]. For posthumanist interventions in animal 
rights debates, see for instance, Cary Wolfe, Zoontologies: The Question Of The Animal [29]. For the concept of 
“geological agency”, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses” [30]. 
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vital role in helping us to “come away with a better understanding of all the alternative ways our own 
society might choose to configure itself, with their attendant risks”, not just by exposing us to particular 
historical theories, options, and experiments, but by enlarging our imaginations in ways that incline us to 
think about the sorts of “unapprehended relations” that can have a more important influence—both 
positive and negative—than some of the more obvious but limited aspects of our debates. 
Will this knowledge come in handy? Will it have direct application in some lucrative 
enterprise? It might well. Stranger things have happened. In the meantime, this sort of study 
instills in the student an appreciation for the richness of our human enterprise. It shows that 
the way we live is not the way we have always lived, nor is it the way everyone lives. It 
demonstrates the role of ideas and the possibility of massive change. It is harder, having 
contemplated such things, to go back to a rote existence. Not impossible, but harder [25]. 
As we struggle with the challenge of facing up to the problems and possibilities of the future, this may 
be the greatest advantage that the humanities have to offer. They can help us to become intolerant of 
reductive thinking (though this adds to the importance of resisting unconvincing clichés about stimulus 
and innovation in the arguments that we pose on our own behalf). They can encourage us to think about 
new innovations in the context of larger questions about their “utility” or “impact”: who will they help? 
What might the consequences be? How can these best be addressed? What have we missed when we 
fixate on the ideas that do seem important to us? The humanities are very definitely not the only place on 
the disciplinary map where this kind of training goes on, but when it is done well, it plays a vital and in 
many ways unique role in cultivating this atmosphere of engaged citizenship in which insisting on the 
stubborn importance of questions may be as profitable as a struggle to come up with the sorts of answers 
that can too easily descend into technical fine-tuning. Their ability to make us more comfortable with 
complexity and more focused on the “unapprehended” implications of the kinds of research that we are 
prioritizing may even lessen the danger of “exasperat[ing]...the extremes of luxury and want” that 
remain stubbornly in place two centuries after Shelley’s Defense. In a utilitarian age marked by the 
scramble to embrace “commercially viable” forms of knowledge, that is a point worth making. 
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